HISTORY AND MISSION
When David Bushnell, the inventor of sea mines, set his explosive torpedoes (mines) adrift in the Delaware River, he started a form of naval warfare that was at first branded unethical. For many years thereafter, the sea mine was considered a “devilish device” used only by “unchivalrous” nations. Mr. Bushnell also constructed the first submarine ever to be used in combat, which was really an afterthought designed to simply transport his later mines to enemy vessels.
His AMERICAN TURTLE was successfully launched against the British flagship HMS EAGLE in September of 1776, piloted by Ezra Lee. The craft made its way underwater to the underside of the EAGLE's hull. Unfortunately, Lee first struck metal rather than wood with the screw intended to attach the mine to the enemy's hull. After a second failed attempt, Lee propelled the AMERICAN TURTLE away, only to be observed and chased. The mine was released into the water and resulted in a frightening explosion. While the AMERICAN TURTLE failed to destroy its target, the British recognized the threat and moved its fleet away from the immediate area.
Robert Fulton, of steamboat fame, designed several sea mines between the years 1797 and 1812 that he tried unsuccessfully to sell to France, Great Britain, and the United States. One test of his mines was conducted against the Danish Brig DOROTHEA in 1805 (see illustration on page 1‑2), which was the first time in history that a mine sunk such a large ship. Although many of his mines were successfully tested, none ever received much military support. Up to the middle of the 19th century, sea mines were used in several wars in Europe and Asia, but with little or no consequence.
It was not until the American Civil War that mines were used on a relatively large scale. At that point in time, it was no secret that the Confederate Navy was inferior to the Federal Navy and, to compensate for this disparity, it needed a weapon that could be produced quickly and cheaply. The Confederates also had an extensive coastline filled with shallow inlets, bays, and bayous to defend and quickly discovered that the Naval mine was an ideal weapon which with to do so.
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The Brig DOROTHEA Damaged in a Mine Test |
The Confederates adopted and put to effective use several types of mines. As a result, the losses inflicted upon the
Federal Navy were quite large. Mines sank twenty‑seven Federal Navy vessels during the Battle of Mobile Bay while only nine were sunk by artillery fire. The total craft lost to mines might have been higher but for the fact that, after the battle, the Federal forces found that many of the Confederate mines had been rendered inert due to immersion and wave action.
During World War I, the naval mine emerged as the Allies’ primary weapon against German submarines. To contain these U-boats, the laying of a gigantic “North Sea Barrage,” extending 250 miles from Scotland to Norway, was undertaken by the Allies in June of 1918. Within five months, American and British minelayers planted over 72,000 mines. The war ended as this barrage was on the verge of completion, so how successful it would have been had it been completed earlier remains an unanswered question. Nevertheless, the barrage sank at least six submarines and damaged many more. Moreover, the submarines that risked the barrage and managed to reach the Atlantic wasted a great deal of valuable time and fuel in having to employ the necessary evasive tactics.
The mine had at last become accepted as having played an important and significant role in naval war strategy. Yet, in the years of peace that followed, the mine was all but forgotten despite performing admirably in conflict. It might be concluded that since the mine was an unspectacular weapon, it was not worthy of any great development efforts. However, with the start of World War II, mine development was revived. At that time, the submarine and airplane were introduced as effective mine layers and a number of influence mines were designed. As opposed to contact mines, which were essentially mechanical devices, these influence mines employed electronic target detectors that responded to or were influenced by magnetic, acoustic, and/or pressure changes resulting from a ship entering the mine’s ambient field. In addition, these mines contained the technology to defend themselves against minesweeping and countermining attacks by the enemy. Following their introduction, they were used in large numbers and with a great degree of effectiveness. Needless to say, the extensive use of these weapons placed an immense burden upon the mine countermeasures forces of both the Allied and Axis powers.
One of the classic examples of the use of influence mines was a multi-phased mining campaign called Operation Starvation, carried out by the United States against the Japanese during the final stages of the Pacific war. U.S. aircraft laid over 12,000 mines in Japanese shipping routes and harbor approaches, sinking 650 Japanese ships and totally disrupting all of their maritime shipping. Japan was unprepared to cope with these influence mines which saturated her home waters. Those ships not sunk by mines were either forced to stay in closed ports or diverted to a few overcrowded ports where they were prone to U.S. submarine and aircraft attack. The virtual collapse of Japan’s seaborne transportation and heavy industry resulted.
After World War II, there was a great deal of pressure to demobilize and scale back the military. Further, with the advent of nuclear weapons, simple and crude weapons such as sea mines seemed rather useless or at least not as glamorous to many individuals. After all, if future wars were to be decided by aircraft and nuclear weapons (as many believed at the time), what place would there be for mines? The Korean War proved that this was a bad assumption.
At the time, the North Korean Navy consisted of only forty-five vessels. Most of these were either torpedo boats or gunboats, and both types were easily destroyed or diverted by superior American Naval forces. The only real opposition our Navy faced from the sea was a successful mining campaign: an American invasion fleet of 250 ships was held up for six days at Wonsan harbor due to the presence of an enemy minefield consisting of 3,000 mines. The U.S. Navy had temporarily lost control of the seas to a tiny nation using pre-World War I weapons laid by vessels that were being used at the time of Christ’s birth! The (then) Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, observed: “When you can’t go where you want to go, when you want to, you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation for all of our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine‑conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re going to start getting mine-conscious.” It’s important to note that during the first two years of the Korean War, all U.S. Navy ship losses and 70 percent of their casualties were directly related to mine warfare. Further, minesweeping personnel made up only 2 percent of our naval forces in Korea, but accounted for over 20 percent of the naval casualties.
A new family of bomb-type mines called Destructors (DSTs) first came into use in 1967 during the Vietnam War. Apparently, the term “destructor” was employed to circumvent any political implications resulting from the use of the term “mine.” These DSTs contained highly sophisticated, solid-state firing mechanisms that were inserted into the fuse wells of simple, general-purpose bombs. Early versions of these mechanisms were entirely magnetic but, by the end of the mining campaign, DSTs also incorporated a seismic capability. A real advantage was their ability to be air-dropped on either land or water, as was done on the Ho Chi Minh trail and along Vietnam’s coastline. Late in the war, over 11,000 DSTs were used during Operation Linebacker to reduce the quantity of junks and sampans used to import war goods through the Haiphong port area. These DSTs helped to reduce the flow of war materials through the port by up to 90 percent.
Since the Vietnam War, a new family of QUICKSTRIKE mines using sophisticated actuation systems with variable sensitivity settings has been used successfully to close enemy waterways in a variety of military conflicts, the most memorable being Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Clearly, the mine of today has come a long way since Bushnell’s keg of 1777. Not only is the sea mine more sophisticated, but its strategic potential has steadily increased. Unspectacular, yes, but it is one of our cheapest and best weapons for helping to achieve absolute sea control.
Mine warfare forces, to include surface/airborne countermeasures, Naval Special Warfare Teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) detachments, and surveillance/reconnaissance assets are particularly valuable in a wide variety of roles and missions. Their most distinctive attributes are flexibility, mobility, agility, and sustainability. These forces can operate throughout the world’s oceans and in the littoral or coastal areas in times of peace, crisis, or war. Recent crises in the Middle East have graphically demonstrated the need to ensure comprehensive capabilities in mine warfare, especially in the shallow, very shallow, and surf‑zone areas of future naval operations. Our ability to conduct effective and efficient mine countermeasures operations, and to use naval mines in tactical situations for both offensive and defensive purposes, will be key to our power projection from the sea.

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